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I. INTRODUCTION
A corporation's managers1 generally owe a fiduciary duty to the
corporation and its shareholders. 2 Legal scholars interpret this duty as
requiring the managers to maximize shareholder value. 3 When a firm
1. By "managers," we mean those officers and directors who have decisionmaking power in
the firm.
2. Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking a Corporation's Obligations to Creditors, 17 CARDOZO L.
REV. 647, 649 (1996).
3. See MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATION LAW 97 (1995) (reporting
that corporate law scholars "generally agree... that management's principal fiduciary duty is to
maximize the return to the common shareholders"); Thomas A. Smith, The Efficient Norm for
Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty, 98 MICH. L. REV. 214, 214
(1999) (reporting that "the orthodox view among corporate law scholars is that the corporate
fiduciary duty is a norm that requires firm managers to maximize shareholder value").
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is solvent, the obligation to maximize shareholder value tends to give
managers an incentive to deploy firm assets efficiently-that is, in a
way that maximizes total value.
When a firm is insolvent, however, the duty to maximize
shareholder value could lead managers to take actions that reduce the
value of debt more than they increase the value of equity and
therefore reduce total value. Accordingly, a number of courts have
held that upon a firm's insolvency, managers owe a fiduciary duty not
only to shareholders but also to creditors. 4
The courts have yet to clearly articulate how managers of an
insolvent firm should balance the interests of shareholders against
those of creditors. However, economically oriented legal scholars
addressing this issue have argued that managers of an insolvent firm
should have a duty to maximize the sum of the values of all financial
claims (both those held by shareholders and those held by creditors)
against the firm.5 Put differently, an insolvent firm's managers should
maximize the total financial value of the firm, not just the value of its
equity.6 We call this view the "financial value maximization" ("FVM")
approach.
To be sure, an insolvency-triggered fiduciary duty to maximize
the financial value of the firm would be difficult to enforce. Thus, one
might argue that even if courts were to impose an FVM duty on
managers of insolvent firms, that duty would have little effect on
managers' behavior. Whether or not it would affect managers'
behavior, however, FVM is considered to be the conceptually correct
approach to managers' fiduciary duty upon their firm's insolvency. 7
4. See, e.g., In re Xonics, Inc., 99 B.R. 870, 872 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989); cf. Schwarcz, supra
note 2, at 667-68.
5. See Gregory Scott Crespi, Rethinking Corporate Fiduciary Duties: The Inefficiency of the
Shareholder Primacy Norm, 55 SMU L. REV. 141, 152-53 (2002); Smith, supra note 3, at 223
(proposing as a default rule that firm managers "make the choices that would maximize the
value of the sum of financial claims against the corporation... whether doing so primarily
benefited shareholders or some other class of corporate claimants").
6. See, e.g., Crespi, supra note 5, at 143; Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty upon
Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors' Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1497
(1993); Smith, supra note 3, at 218.
7. Our own view is that judicially articulated fiduciary duties, even if they are
unenforceable, can influence managerial behavior by affecting social norms. See, e.g., Robert
Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized Norms, 86 VA.
L. REV. 1577 (2000); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
1253 (1999); Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms
and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619 (2001); Edward B. Rock, Saints and
Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009 (1997); cf. LYNN
STOUT, ON THE EXPORT OF U.S.-STYLE CORPORATE FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO OTHER CULTURES: CAN
A TRANSPLANT TAKE? (UCLA Research Series, Working Paper 02-11, 2002) (observing a
relatively high degree of compliance with fiduciary duties by U.S. corporate insiders even in the
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This Article demonstrates that the FVM approach is, in fact,
conceptually flawed. Proponents of FVM conclude correctly that when
a firm is insolvent, efficiency requires that the interests of
shareholders and .creditors should be equally weighted: $1 of
shareholder value should be treated the same as $1 of creditor value.
However, supporters of FVM overlook the fact that an insolvent firm
is likely to have two types of creditors: (1) "payment creditors"-
parties owed a fixed cash payment, which have a financial claim
against the firm; and (2) "performance creditors"-parties owed
contractual performance, which have a claim for performance against
the firm.
8
The FVM approach, which creates a duty to maximize solely
the financial value of the insolvent firm, requires managers to take
into account the effect of their actions on payment creditors and to
ignore their impact on performance creditors. From an economic
perspective, there is no justification for treating the interests of these
two types of creditors differently. Indeed, as we explain, the
requirement to maximize the financial value of the insolvent firm
regardless of the effect on performance creditors might obligate
managers to take steps that harm performance creditors more than
they benefit payment creditors and shareholders and therefore are
inefficient.
We identify two potential distortions that may arise under the
FVM approach. First, managers seeking to maximize the financial
value of an insolvent firm might have an incentive to inefficiently
underinvest in the firm's ability to perform its contracts, reducing the
likelihood that the firm will be able to meet its contractual obligations.
Second, in certain situations, managers might have an incentive to
choose to breach value-creating contracts that the firm could perform.
Neither of these distortions would arise under the FVM
approach if the firm were solvent. If a solvent firm cannot (or chooses
not to) perform a contract, the firm is forced to pay the injured party
full monetary damages for breach, which reduces the firm's financial
value by that amount. Thus, the firm and those with claims against its
financial value fully internalize the cost breach imposes on the other
absence of effective external rewards and punishments, and attributing this to insiders'
preference to "do the right thing"). However, this Article abstracts from the question of how
fiduciary duties affect managers' decisionmaking in order to focus on what the content of those
duties should be.
8. A "performance creditor" would include any party that has an "executory"
(unperformed) contract with the firm, including a party that (1) owes performance to the firm
and (2) has not been paid in full by the firm. For ease of exposition, however, we will assume that
performance creditors are owed performance by the firm. This assumption does not affect the
Article's analysis or its conclusions.
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party. As a result, managers seeking to maximize the financial value
of the firm would decide to reduce the firm's investment in its ability
to perform, or choose not to perform a contract, only if the financial
benefit to the firm from that decision exceeds the cost to the other
party.
An insolvent firm, on the other hand, is unlikely to pay the
injured party full damages when it breaches. Consequently, the firm
and those with claims against its financial value fail to internalize
completely the cost breach imposes on the other party. Managers
seeking to maximize the financial value of the firm therefore might
decide to reduce the firm's investment in its ability to perform a
contract, or choose not to perform a contract, even when the benefit to
the firm is less than the cost to the other party.
To be sure, not all insolvent firms have unperformed contracts.
Such contracts, which include unexpired intellectual property licenses,
franchise agreements, leases, and long-term supply contracts, are
more common in some business settings than in others. But in many
important sectors of the economy-for, example, the software
industry-such licenses and other long-term arrangements play a
significant role. And whenever an insolvent firm owes performance
under one or more contracts, the FVM approach could give managers
an incentive to act inefficiently.
Our analysis indicates that an insolvent firm's managers
should have as their objective the maximization of the sum of the
values of all claims-both financial and performance-against the
firm. Put differently, managers should maximize the sum of the
financial value and "performance value" (the value of performance to
performance creditors) of the firm, even if doing so reduces the
financial value of the firm.9
Although our proposed approach might make equityholders of
insolvent firms worse off ex post, it would actually benefit them ex
ante by a greater amount. In a world where managers of insolvent
firms maximize the total value of the firm, rather than only the
financial value of the firm, parties would agree to enter into contracts
with firms on more favorable terms. And to the extent our approach
reduces the deadweight loss associated with the identified distortions,
the expected ex ante benefit provided by these more favorable contract
terms would outweigh the expected ex post costs to shareholders
9. We assume that the only parties affected by managers' decisions upon a firm's
insolvency are those holding financial and performance claims against the firm. To the extent
that other parties-such as potential tort victims-are affected by managers' decisions, our




arising from the "dilution" of their fiduciary protection to
accommodate the firm's performance creditors.
Before proceeding, we should note that this Article abstracts
from the important question of when managers' fiduciary duty should
broaden to include creditors. The courts have used a number of
different tests to determine the moment at which managers' fiduciary
duties shift, 10 while commentators have suggested a variety of
others.1" The most radical approach is that proposed by Thomas
Smith, one of the proponents of FVM, who argues that even when a
firm is legally solvent there is always some possibility that the firm
will fail (either despite the managers' decisions or because of them).
12
Thus, the distortions that may arise from shareholder value
maximization when the firm is legally insolvent may also be present-
though to a lesser degree-even when the firm is legally solvent.
Accordingly, Smith argues that at all times managers should be
required to maximize the sum of the values of all financial claims
against the firm.
13
For purposes of this Article, however, it does not matter when
managers' fiduciary duty is considered to shift to include creditors.
Our claim is that whenever managers begin to owe a fiduciary duty to
creditors, they should owe such a duty not only to payment creditors
but to performance creditors as well. Otherwise, managers might have
an incentive to act in ways that reduce the value available to all the
parties with claims against the firm.
The remainder of the Article is organized as follows. Part II
describes the rise of the FVM approach. It first explains why the
shareholder value maximization approach (which tends to create
desirable incentives when the firm is solvent) is likely to create
undesirable incentives when the firm is insolvent. Next, it considers
the possibility of a creditor value maximization approach, and shows
why such an approach is also likely to create undesirable incentives
when the firm is insolvent. Part II then concludes by explaining why
commentators believe that FVM avoids the problems associated with
the other two approaches. Part III demonstrates the problem with the
FVM approach. By providing fiduciary protection to one type of
10. For discussions of courts' approaches to the timing issue, see, e.g., Andrew D. Shaffer,
Corporate Fiduciary-Insolvent: The Fiduciary Relationship Your Corporate Law Professor
(Should Have) Warned You About, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 479, 546 (2000); Ronald Trost et
al., Fiduciary Duties of Directors in the Chapter 11 and Insolvency Contexts, SE71 ALI-ABA 265,
290 (2000).
11. See, e.g., Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 647.
12. Smith, supra note 3, at 223-24.
13. Id. at 238.
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creditor-payment creditors-but not to the other-performance
creditors, FVM gives rise to two potential distortions: (1)
underinvestment in the firm's ability to perform its contracts; and (2)
inefficient breach versus performance decisions. We also show in Part
III that two mechanisms that might be used to eliminate these
distortions-the use of security interests ex ante and renegotiation ex
post-cannot be counted on to do so. Part IV puts forward our
proposed approach to the fiduciary duty of managers of insolvent
firms-namely, that managers be required to maximize the value of
all claims against the firm. It shows that such an approach avoids the
problems associated with FVM and, if it were adopted by managers,
would benefit shareholders ex ante. Part V sets forth our conclusions.
II. THE RISE OF THE FINANCIAL VALUE MAXIMIZATION APPROACH
The purpose of this part is to describe the leading approach to
managers' fiduciary duties when the firm is insolvent-the financial
value maximization approach-and briefly explain the reasoning that
has led legal commentators to conclude that this approach provides
managers with an incentive to act efficiently. Section A describes what
we call the "shareholder value maximization" ("SVM") approach,
which characterizes managers' fiduciary duty when the firm is
solvent. It explains that while SVM tends to give managers
appropriate incentives when the firm is solvent, it can distort
managers' incentives when the firm is insolvent. In particular, SVM
can cause an insolvent firm's managers to take excessive risks at
creditors' expense. Section B considers an alternative approach to
managers' fiduciary duty when the firm is insolvent, which we call
"creditor value maximization" ("CVM"), and explains why CVM would
also distort managers' incentives. Section C describes the FVM
approach, which was developed by commentators in an attempt to
provide managers of insolvent firms with desirable incentives.
A. The Shareholder Value Maximization Approach
1. Shareholder Value Maximization in a Solvent Firm
It is a fundamental principle of corporate law that the
managers of a solvent corporation owe a fiduciary duty to the
corporation and its residual claimants, the shareholders. 14 Under this
duty, managers must place the interests of the corporation's
14. See Lin, supra note 6, at 1510 & n.82; Smith, supra note 3, at 231.
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shareholders ahead of their own interests and ahead of the interests of
any other parties with claims against the firm's value, including
creditors.' 5 Creditors have been considered adequately protected by
their contractual agreements with the firm. 16 Thus, it has been widely
believed that there is no need to extend fiduciary protection to
creditors. 17
Modern corporate law scholars have interpreted this
shareholder-oriented fiduciary duty as obligating managers to
maximize the value of shareholders' equity interests in the firm.'8
When the firm is solvent and very likely to remain so, the obligation to
maximize shareholder value tends to give managers an incentive to
deploy firm assets efficiently-that is, in a way that maximizes total
value. 19
Consider first the hypothetical case in which the firm will be
solvent forever, and everybody knows that the firm will be solvent
forever. In this hypothetical situation, managers know that
shareholders always will be the firm's only residual claimants and
thus that they benefit $1 from every $1 increase in firm value, and
lose $1 from every $1 decrease in firm value. Under this scenario,
managers maximize shareholder value if, and only if, they maximize
total value.20 As a result, shareholder value maximization corresponds
to total value maximization.
In the real world, of course, no firm is certain to be solvent
forever. Any firm could find itself in a position where it is unable to
15. See, e.g., United States v. Jolly, 102 F.3d 46, 48 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that "a firm's
obligations to creditors are generally regarded as solely contractual" and that creditors are not
owed duties as shareholders); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1519,
1524-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (refusing to imply a covenant of good faith in a debenture contract and
restricting the duties owed a creditor to those expressly delineated in the agreement); Simons v.
Cogan, 549 A.2d 300, 300-04 (Del. 1988) (holding that an owner of a convertible debenture was a
creditor of the corporation and thus protected only "by the contractual terms of the indenture").
16. See Lin, supra note 6, at 1511; Smith, supra note 3, at 231.
17. See, e.g., Lin, supra note 6, at 1511.
18. See DOOLEY, supra note 3, at 97 (reporting that corporate law scholars "generally
agree ... that management's principal fiduciary duty is to maximize the return to the common
shareholders"); Smith, supra note 3, at 214 (reporting that "the orthodox view among corporate
law scholars is that the corporate fiduciary duty is a norm that requires firm managers to
'maximize shareholder value' "); Richard A. Booth, Stockholders, Stakeholders, and Bagholders
(or How Investor Diversification Affects Fiduciary Duty), 53 BuS. LAW. 429, 430 (1998) (reporting
that most scholars of corporate law agree that managers have a duty to maximize shareholder
value).
19. See Lin, supra note 6, at 1490.
20. We make the standard assumption that the firm's activities do not create any
externalities (positive or negative) on third parties that are not in a contractual relationship with
the firm, such as the firm's competitors.
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pay its debts. 21 As Thomas Smith has argued, managers could render
almost any firm insolvent by distributing assets to shareholders and
taking sufficiently risky bets with the assets that remain.22 And, to
the extent the firm can become or be made insolvent, shareholders
cease to be the only residual claimants: creditors also bear part of the
risk.
However, as long as managers run the firm in a way that keeps
the likelihood of insolvency relatively low, shareholders remain the
primary residual claimants. Under these conditions, managers
seeking to maximize shareholder value tend to have an incentive to
deploy firm assets efficiently.
23
2. Shareholder Value Maximization in an Insolvent Firm: The
Problem of Excessive Risk Taking
Although the shareholder value maximization approach tends
to promote desirable behavior by managers when the firm is solvent
and is highly likely to remain so, it is well understood that it may lead
to undesirable behavior when the firm is insolvent. 24 In particular,
managers might have an incentive to benefit shareholders in ways
that impose a larger cost on creditors. For example, managers might
have an incentive to choose excessively risky projects.
25
The following example illustrates the problem:
Example 1: Suppose that Firm has $100 of debt due at the end
of the year. If Firm continues in its current "safe" line of business
("S"), it will have assets totaling $80 by the end of the year. As a
result, Firm will default on its debt and be taken over by its creditors.
Alternatively, Firm could change to a different "risky" line of business
("Ro"). If Firm switches to business Ro, there is a 50% likelihood that
Firm will have assets totaling $120 by the end of the year and a 50%
likelihood that it will have no assets by the end of the year. Because
the expected value of business Ro is $60 and the expected value of
business S is $80, from an efficiency perspective, Firm's managers
should choose business S. However, if Firm continues in business S,
the expected value of equity is $0, and if Firm switches to business Ro,
the expected value of equity is $10 (50% of $20). Thus, shareholder
21. See Smith, supra note 3, at 223.
22. Id. at 224.
23. See Lin, supra note 6, at 1490, 1497 & n.15.
24. See, e.g., id. at 1490.
25. Other ways in which managers might seek to benefit shareholders at creditors' expense
include (1) delaying the liquidation of a company in an attempt to preserve its option value; and
(2) withdrawing assets from the corporation.
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value maximization would lead managers to choose business Ro over
business S, which is inefficient.
The intuition behind this example is that when the firm would
otherwise fail and leave shareholders with nothing, managers seeking
to maximize shareholder value will have an incentive to choose a
different strategy-one in which there is some possibility that the firm
will be able to pay its debts. The alternative strategy will be chosen
even if the risks and cost of failure, which are borne entirely by
creditors, are too high.26 The shareholders have little or nothing to
lose, and something to gain, by the managers pursuing such a high-
risk strategy.
B. Creditor Value Maximization in an Insolvent Firm
1. Creditor Value Maximization and the Elimination of Excessive
Risk Taking
Because the possibility of insolvency makes creditors residual
claimants, and because shareholder value maximization can lead to
excessive risk taking at their expense, it is worth briefly considering
an alternative approach to managers' fiduciary duty upon insolvency:
creditor value maximization. Under such an approach, managers of an
insolvent firm would be obligated to maximize the value of creditors'
claims. The CVM approach is not purely hypothetical. A number of
courts have held that, upon insolvency, managers owe a fiduciary duty
exclusively to creditors.
27
The advantage of CVM-or indeed any approach that takes
into account creditors' welfare-is that it eliminates the excessive risk
taking that can result when managers seek to maximize shareholder
value without regard to the effect on creditors.
Consider the following example:
Example 2: Suppose that, as in Example 1, Firm owes $100
that is due at the end of the year, and has the same two business
opportunities: S, which will leave Firm with assets totaling $80 by the
end of the year, and Ro, which has a 50% probability of leaving Firm
with assets totaling $120 by the end of the year and a 50% probability
of leaving Firm with no assets. We saw in Example 1 that SVM would
lead managers to choose business Ro over business S, an outcome that
is inefficient. Now suppose that managers must instead maximize
creditor value. The expected value of creditors' claims under business
26. See Lin, supra note 6, at 1491.
27. See, e.g., Amussen v. Quaker City Corp., 156 A. 180, 181 (Del. Ch. 1931); Schwarcz,
supra note 2, at 667-68.
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S is $80. The expected value of those claims under business Ro is $50
(50% of $100). An obligation to maximize creditor value (or indeed any
duty focusing exclusively on creditors' interests) would require
managers to choose business S-the value-maximizing decision.
The intuition is that under the CVM approach, managers seek
to maximize the value available to creditors and do not take into
account the effect of their decisions on shareholders. Thus, they will
not engage in risky strategies that reduce the value of creditors'
claims. To the extent managers avoid strategies that reduce the value
of creditors' claims, they will not pursue any inefficient strategy
having that effect.
2. Creditor Value Maximization and the Problem of Insufficient
Risk Taking
Although CVM eliminates the problem of excessive risk taking
upon a firm's insolvency, such a duty can give rise to the opposite
problem: insufficient risk taking. In particular, managers required to
maximize creditor value when the firm is insolvent might forgo risky
opportunities that increase total value because they make creditors
worse off. This problem, of course, is the inevitable result of an
approach that seeks to maximize creditor value without regard to the
effect on shareholder value.
Example 3: Suppose again that Firm has $100 of debt due at
the end of the year, and that if Firm continues in its "safe" business
("S"), it will have assets totaling $80 by the end of the year. As a
result, Firm will default on its debt and be taken over by its creditors.
Firm could change to a "risky" business ("Ri"), which has a higher
expected value than business S: it will leave the firm with $200 in
assets by the end of the year with a 50% probability, and no assets
with a 50% probability. The expected value of business Ri is therefore
$100, $20 more than the value of business S. From an efficiency
perspective, Firm's managers should choose business Ri. However, if
Firm continues in business S, the expected value of the debt is $80,
and if Firm switches to business R1, the expected value of debt is $50.
In that case, CVM would lead managers to an inefficient result, i.e.,
the selection of business S over business R 1.
The intuition behind this example is that creditors bear most of
the downside if the firm does poorly but do not enjoy much of the
upside if the firm does very well. Therefore, CVM leads managers to
2002] 1823
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act conservatively, even if the total value available to both creditors
and equityholders is thereby reduced.
28
C. Financial Value Maximization upon Insolvency
As we saw in Sections A and B, both the SVM and CVM
approaches can give managers an incentive to act inefficiently when
the firm becomes insolvent. Each approach is flawed because it
obligates managers to make decisions for the benefit of one class of
claimholders without considering the effect of those decisions on the
other.2
9
Most courts have held that upon insolvency a firm's managers
owe a fiduciary duty both to shareholders and to creditors. However,
none of these courts-with the possible exception of the Delaware
Chancery Court-has described exactly how the interests of
shareholders should be balanced against the interests of creditors.
Should shareholders' interests be given priority, in accordance with
the notion of shareholder primacy underlying managers' fiduciary
duty when the firm is solvent? Or should creditors' interests be given
priority, in the spirit of older court holdings that managers of an
insolvent firm owe a fiduciary duty exclusively to creditors?
Among the legal commentators who have addressed this
question, the prevailing view is that an insolvent firm's managers
should maximize the sum of the values of all of the financial claims
against the firm-or, equivalently, the financial value of the firm
itself.30  Chancellor William Allen's opinion in the well-known
Delaware Chancery Court Credit Lyonnais decision can be read as
endorsing this view.31 The purpose of this approach, which we call the
28. Creditors might also prefer that the firm be liquidated earlier than is optimal. Lin,
supra note 6, at 1494.
29. See id. at 1496-97.
30. See Crespi, supra note 5, at 152-53; Lin, supra note 6, at 1485, 1500; Smith, supra note
3, at 218; cf. Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 527, 583 (1983) (describing the incentives of managers of an insolvent firm, and
suggesting that the resulting distortions "might be avoided by a concept of corporate duty of
officers and directors to the abstract firm, not just to its shareholders").
31. Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., No.
Civ.A. 12150, 1991 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215 (1991). Chancellor William Allen wrote that the board of a
solvent company in "the vicinity of insolvency" has an "obligation to the co'mmunity of interest
that sustained the corporation, to exercise judgment in an informed, good faith effort to
maximize the corporation's long-term wealth creating capacity." Id. at *109. In footnote 55, the
court offered a numerical example in which managers had to choose whether to accept a
settlement offer or proceed with litigation. Id. at *108 n.55. The settlement offer exceeded the
expected value of litigating. Id. However, because bondholders would receive most of the
settlement, shareholders would be better off if the managers turned down the settlement offer
and litigated. The court concluded that the managers should settle the case because settlement
1824 [Vol. 55:1813
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financial value maximization approach, is to discourage managers
from taking steps that increase shareholder value by less than they
reduce creditor value (and vice versa). Such an approach would
eliminate the problems of excessive risk taking and insufficient risk
taking associated with giving preference to one type of investor
interest over the other. Because the FVM approach is believed to
increase the value available to the parties (as a group) ex post,
proponents argue that shareholders and creditors would bargain for it
ex ante if they had the ability to do so.
32
III. THE PROBLEM WITH FINANCIAL VALUE MAXIMIZATION
We saw in Part II that managers seeking to maximize
shareholder value or to maximize creditor value might, upon
insolvency, have an incentive to act in a way that reduces the total
value available to shareholders and creditors. Commentators have
thus suggested that managers should maximize the value of the sum
of all financial claims against the firm-or, equivalently, the financial
value of the firm itself.
33
The purpose of this part is to point out an unrecognized
problem with the FVM approach. The problem with FVM is that it
fails to recognize that there are likely to be two types of creditors: (1)
parties owed cash by the firm, which we call "payment creditor ," that
hold financial claims against the firm; and (2) parties owed
contractual performance by the firm, which we call "performance
creditors," that have claims for performance against the firm. FVM
requires managers to take into account the effect of their decisions on
the first group of creditors, payment creditors, but not on the second
group, performance creditors.
As this part explains, there is no economic justification for
denying performance creditors the fiduciary protection accorded to
payment creditors. Indeed, just as SVM and CVM can give rise to
distortions by requiring managers to ignore the effects of their
decisions on the other type of claimholder, FVM can create distortions
by requiring managers to ignore the effect of their decisions on
performance creditors.
would, by providing a higher expected value, make the "community of interests that the
corporation represents"-in this case the bondholders and shareholders-better off. Id. Although
the court applies FVM in this particular example, it leaves open the possibility that the
community of interests could include nonfinancial claimants, such as employees. If so, the court
would be endorsing an approach different from FVM.
32. See Smith, supra note 3, at 244.
33. See, e.g., id. at 238.
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Section A explains why FVM would not distort managers'
decisions when a firm is solvent. When a firm is solvent, it can be
forced, under the expectation damages rule, to provide full financial
compensation for any damages it causes by breaching its contract with
a performance creditor. As a result, the firm and those with financial
claims against it fully internalize the cost that breach imposes on the
performance creditor. Thus, even if the managers of a solvent firm are
seeking only to maximize the financial value of the firm, the
expectation damages rule forces them to take into account the effect of
their decisions on performance creditors.
However, as Section B explains, when the firm is insolvent,
managers do not expect the firm to pay full expectation damages when
it breaches a contract. In particular, if the insolvent firm breaches and
then enters bankruptcy, any breach of contract claim by the injured
party will be treated as a prebankruptcy unsecured claim, and the
injured party will receive only a fraction of the claim's face amount.
Section C examines the two types of distortions that may result
under the FVM approach when managers anticipate that the insolvent
firm can breach without paying full damages. First, FVM might cause
managers to underinvest in the firm's ability to perform its contracts.
Second, managers seeking to maximize the financial value of the firm
might choose to breach a contract that the firm is able to perform even
when the cost of breach imposed on the firm's contract partner exceeds
the benefit of breach to the insolvent firm.
While these distortions impose costs on the performance
creditor ex post, they force the potentially insolvent firm to contract on
worse terms ex ante. Thus, it will be in the parties' joint interest to
take steps to avoid these distortions. Section D considers two
mechanisms that might enable the parties to avoid these distortion
costs: (1) security interests, which would make any damage claim
secured, and therefore payable in full; and (2) renegotiation of the
contract terms to capture the surplus that otherwise would be lost
because of underinvestment and inefficient breach. Although these
mechanisms may reduce the frequency of these distortions, we explain
why they are very unlikely to eliminate them.
A. Financial Value Maximization When Firm Pays Full Damages
for Breach
Under ordinary contract law, a party breaching a contract must
pay damages if its contract partner is injured by the breach. Under
the so-called expectation damages rule, the measure of damages is the
amount that is necessary to put the injured party in the same
[Vol. 55:18131826
MANAGERS'FIDUCIARY DUTY
economic position it would have occupied had the contract been
performed.3 4 Therefore, expectation damages are designed to provide
full financial compensation to the injured party for breach.
Whether the injured party actually can collect full expectation
damages, however, depends on whether the breaching firm is solvent.
If the breaching firm is solvent, it could be forced to pay full
expectation damages. Thus, a solvent firm's managers considering
breaching a contract will expect the firm to pay full expectation
damages upon breach. As a result, the firm and those with financial
claims against it fully internalize the cost breach imposes on the other
party. Even if managers are seeking only to maximize the financial
value of the firm, when the firm is solvent the expectation damages
rule forces them to consider the effect of their decisions on
performance creditors. As is already familiar, when the firm is solvent
the expectation damages rule generally discourages breach when
performance is value-creating and encourages breach when
performance is value-wasting. 35 (Moreover, as we will explain shortly,
when the firm is solvent the expectation damages rule encourages
managers seeking to maximize the financial value of the firm to invest
in the firm's ability to perform contracts when it is efficient to do so.)
Consider the following example, which we will use throughout
the remainder of this Article. Suppose that a corporation ("Firm")
enters into a contract with another party ("Contract Partner") to
supply the latter with software, and a subsequent update of the
software, in exchange for $100 paid immediately and another $10 to
be paid upon delivery of the software update. After supplying Contract
Partner with the software and receiving $100, Firm considers the
extent to which it should invest in its ability to produce the software
update and receive the additional $10. The update would provide a
$50 benefit to Contract Partner, for a net benefit of $40 ($50 less $10).
Suppose Firm is solvent. Contract Partner could recover full
expectation damages of $40 if Firm were to breach by failing to supply
the software update. Because Firm would be required to compensate
Contract Partner in full, Firm would bear all of the costs breach
imposes on Contract Partner. Thus, to the extent Firm's managers are
seeking to maximize the firm's financial value on behalf of financial
claimholders, the managers have an incentive to perform the contract
34. See generally Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of
Efficient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 629, 636 (1988).
35. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 117-26 (4th ed. 1991); John
H. Barton, The Economic Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 277 (1972);
Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. ECON. 466, 478-79 (1980).
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unless the benefit of breach to Firm exceeds $40-that is, unless
breach is efficient. 3
6
B. The Cost of Breach to an Insolvent Firm: "Ratable Damages"
As Section A explained, when a firm can be made to pay full
damages for breach, managers obligated to maximize the firm's value
would not have an incentive to take steps that harm a contract
partner more than they benefit the firm. As this section explains,
however, an insolvent firm's managers do not expect the firm to pay
full damages when they have the firm breach a contract.
We consider two cases. In the first case, at the time the firm's
managers must make a contract investment or performance decision,
the managers know with certainty that the firm will become
bankrupt. In the second, at the time of decision, managers know that
there is a positive probability (less than 100%) that the firm will
become bankrupt. By "become bankrupt," we mean that the firm
cannot pay its debts in full and, as a result, the firm's creditors will be
paid less than the amount they are owed. Such a firm might file for
bankruptcy under Chapter 7 (for liquidation) or Chapter 11 (for
reorganization) of the Bankruptcy Code, enter an insolvency
proceeding under state law, or engage in a voluntary workout or
liquidation with creditors. For our purposes, the particular procedure
used is not important. What matters is that the firm's creditors cannot
be paid in full. However, for ease of exposition, we will assume that if
the firm becomes bankrupt, it will file under Chapter 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code.
1. Expected Cost of Breach When Bankruptcy Is Certain
Let us begin with the simple case in which a firm's managers
know for certain that the firm will file for bankruptcy and that by the
end of the bankruptcy proceeding the firm will not be able to pay in
full all of the claims against it.
As in the previous examples, suppose that Firm enters into a
contract to supply Contract Partner with software and, eventually, an
update to that software. Contract Partner pays Firm $100 for the
software and promises to pay $10 when the update is delivered. After
supplying Contract Partner with the software (and receiving the
$100), but before discharging its obligation to supply the software
update, Firm becomes insolvent. Firm then breaches the contract with
36. In Part III.C.2, we provide a more detailed numerical example illustrating this point.
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Contract Partner by refusing to supply the update and files for
bankruptcy.
Once Firm files for bankruptcy, any damage claim asserted by
Contract Partner either before or after the filing would be considered
an ordinary unsecured claim.37 Holders of such unsecured claims have
a right to receive, pro rata, any value that remains after secured
claims and the claims of certain -priority unsecured creditors have
been satisfied.
38
The effect of these bankruptcy priority rules on the allocation
of the firm's value is significant. Even in cases where a business
debtor successfully reorganizes under Chapter 11,3 9 the mean recovery
by general unsecured creditors is typically only 200 to 300 on the
dollar. 40 One of us has labeled the pro rata recovery of contract breach
damages in bankruptcy the "ratable damages" rule.4
1
Therefore, when Firm's managers know for certain that Firm
will file for bankruptcy, they do not expect to pay full damages for
breach. For example, suppose that, as in the earlier examples,
Contract Partner values the update called for by the contract, for
which it must pay $10, at $50. Thus, Firm's failure to provide the
update would inflict a loss of $40 on Contract Partner. Contract
Partner would then submit a damage claim of $40. Suppose the
payout rate for unsecured claims is 25%. Under such a payout rate,
Contract Partner would be paid $10 (25% of $40). When managers are
37. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(g)(2)(B)(i), 502(g) (2000). For an explanation of why contract
breach claims are usually unsecured, see infra Part III.D. I.
38. The U.S. Bankruptcy Code gives full priority (over ordinary unsecured claims) to
specified unsecured claims, such as postbankruptcy administrative claims and certain wage and
other compensation-related claims. § 507(a).
39. Following a successful Chapter 11 reorganization, the debtor firm continues operating
as an ongoing enterprise. In exchange for their prebankruptcy claims, creditors typically receive
some combination of cash, stock, and debt in the continuing business. In many cases, however,
the attempted reorganization is unsuccessful, and the firm is liquidated piecemeal, either in
Chapter 11 or after the case has been converted to Chapter 7.
40. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, A General Theory of the Dynamics of the State
Remedies/Bankruptcy System, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 311, 311 (1982) (finding that average payout
promised-but not necessarily paid-to general unsecured creditors in reorganization cases was
about 320 per dollar). Even in successful Chapter 11 reorganizations of large, publicly traded
corporations with relatively little secured debts, the average return to general unsecured
creditors is less than 500 on the dollar. See Lynn M., LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Bargaining
over Equity's Share in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U.
PA. L. REV. 125, 142 (1990).
41. See Jesse M. Fried, Executory Contracts and Performance Decisions in Bankruptcy, 46
DUKE L.J. 517, 519 (1996).
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considering whether to have Firm perform or breach the contract, they
will therefore anticipate Firm paying only $10 for breach.
42
2. Expected Cost of Breach When Bankruptcy Is Uncertain
Let us now consider the case in which an insolvent firm's
managers are not certain that the firm will be forced to file for
bankruptcy. Suppose, for example, that there is some possibility that
the firm will financially recover and regain solvency before it is forced
to file for bankruptcy. Suppose further that the firm is considering
breaching a contract. If the firm breaches and then recovers
financially, the firm must pay the damage claim in full. If Firm
breaches and is then (for other reasons) forced to file for bankruptcy,
however, the firm will not pay the breach damage claim in full. In that
case, the firm's managers do not anticipate paying, on an expected
value basis, full damages for breach.
To illustrate numerically, suppose again that if Firm breaches,
Contract Partner will have a damage claim of $40, and that if Firm
enters bankruptcy, the payout rate for unsecured claims will be 25%.
However, now suppose that there is a 20% probability that Firm will
regain solvency and be able to pay the $40 damage claim in full. Thus,
there is only an 80% probability that Firm will be forced to file for
bankruptcy. In that case, the expected cost of breach to Firm will be
$16 (20% of $40 plus 80% of $10). The expected cost of breach is $6
more than when bankruptcy is certain, but still $24 less than Contract
Partner's actual damages.
C. Distortions Caused by FVM When a Firm Pays Ratable Damages
In Section B we saw that when a firm is insolvent, its
managers do not expect the firm to pay full expectation damages for
breaching a contract, but rather expect it to pay only partial damages.
Thus, the insolvent firm and those holding claims for payment against
the firm do not expect to bear the entire cost that breach imposes on
the injured party.
As this section explains, because the firm does not have to bear
all of the costs of breach, managers obligated to maximize the sum of
the values of all financial claims against the firm might choose to
underinvest in the firm's ability to perform its contract, or to breach a
42. Contract Partner will either be paid $10 in cash at the end of the proceeding or will
receive a combination of cash, debt, and/or equity with a value of $10.
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contract the firm could perform.43 We consider each of these
distortions in turn.
1. Underinvestment in Ability to Perform Contracts
We first consider the effect of an insolvent firm's failure to fully
internalize the cost of breach on managers' investment decisions. As
we explain below, when a firm does not expect to pay full damages for
breach, and managers are obligated to maximize the firm's financial
value, managers' investment decisions can be distorted. In particular,
an insolvent firm's managers might underinvest in the firm's ability to
perform its contracts if they know that, on an expected value basis,
the firm will pay less than full damages should it be unable to perform
the contracts and be forced to breach.
Continuing with our example, suppose a particular managerial
decision will affect Firm's future ability to provide the software update
to Contract Partner, and that update will provide Contract Partner
with a benefit of $50 (a net benefit of $40, after taking into account the
$10 payment that Contract Partner must make to Firm). In
particular, suppose that Firm is considering whether to lay off the
computer engineers who had designed the software and who are now
the ones best suited for producing the update required under the
contract. The cost of retaining the engineering group is $15. If Firm
fires the engineering group, however, there is only a 30% chance that
Firm can produce the update. In contrast, there is an 80% likelihood
that Firm can produce the update if Firm retains the engineering
group. For simplicity, assume that the engineering group would
generate no value for Firm other than an increased likelihood that
Firm can produce the software update. Assume further that Firm
would incur no costs in creating the software update beyond the $15
needed to retain the engineering group.44
43. As noted in the Introduction, a "performance creditor" would include any party that has
an "executory" (unperformed) contract with the firm, including a party that (1) owes performance
to the firm and (2) is owed payment for that performance by the firm. If the insolvent firm (1) is
owed performance under an executory contract and (2) has not been paid in full by the firm, the
problem of underinvestment will be different. In this situation, managers seeking to maximize
the firm's financial value may have an incentive to underinvest in the firm's ability to benefit
from the other party's performance, rather than an incentive to underinvest in the firm's ability
to perform. The problem of inefficient breach is essentially the same, except that the insolvent
firm breaches by refusing to pay rather than by refusing to perform.
44. We assume that the parties know the value and cost of performance and that
expectation damages reflect the injured party's actual losses (including litigation expenses).
These assumptions, which are made for simplicity, are not necessary for the Article's analysis
and conclusions. The problems identified by the Article would be less severe if judicially
determined expectation damages far exceeded actual damages (say, by 100% or more). In that
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From an efficiency perspective, it would be desirable for Firm
to retain the engineering group. If Firm lays off the group, the total
expected value associated with the update is $15 (the product of a 30%
likelihood of success and a $50 benefit to Contract Partner). If Firm
retains the group, it will incur a cost of $15. However, if Firm retains
the group, the total expected value associated with the update is $40
(80% likelihood of success and a $50 benefit to Contract Partner). The
total expected value of retaining the engineering group is $25 (or $40
less $15), $10 more than if the engineering group is let go.
Now let us turn to consider Firm's economic incentives.
Assume first that Firm is solvent and can be forced to pay full
damages for breach. When Firm is solvent, managers anticipate that
contract breach would force Firm to pay Contract Partner financial
damages of $40 ($50 forgone benefit to Contract Partner, less $10
avoided payment). If Firm pays $15 and retains the engineering
group, there is only a 20% likelihood that it will not be able to produce
the update, and an 80% likelihood that the firm will produce the
update and receive $10. Here, the expected financial value associated
with retaining the group is 80% of $10 less 20% of $40, all less $15, for
a total of -$15.
If Firm fires the engineering group, it will save $15 in labor
costs. However, there is a 70% likelihood that Firm will breach and be
forced to pay $40 in damages and only a 30% chance that Firm will be
able to perform and make $10. The expected value associated with
Firm firing the engineering group is therefore 30% of $10 less 70% of
$40, which equals -$25. Managers seeking to maximize Firm's
financial value in accordance with the FVM approach thus have an
incentive to retain the engineering group, the socially desirable
outcome, when Firm can be made to pay full damages for breach.
45
Now consider what happens when Firm is insolvent and
expects to file for bankruptcy. Suppose that managers know that Firm
case, even insolvent firms paying ratable damages would still expect to pay a substantial amount
(relative to actual damages) upon breach.
However, it is widely believed that expectation damages in fact undercompensate the injured
party. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg & Brett McDonnell, Expectation Damages and the Theory of
Overreliance, HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript on file with author); Stewart
Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 465, 469-470 (1985); George G.
Triantis, The Effects of Insolvency and Bankruptcy on Contract Performance and Adjustment, 43
U. TORONTO L.J. 679, 687 (1993).
45. The alignment between private and social optimality in this example is not an artifact
of the particular values used. It would be easy to show that when Firm can be made to pay full
expectation damages for breach, managers who are required to maximize the expected value of
payments to payment creditors and shareholders will have an incentive to keep the engineering
group whenever it is efficient to do so. Similarly, the managers will have an incentive to lay off
the engineering group whenever it is inefficient to retain the engineers.
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will file for bankruptcy, and that the expected payout rate in
bankruptcy is 25%.46 In that case, the expected financial value
associated with retaining the group is -$9 ($8, the expected revenues
from delivery of the update (80% of $10), less $2, the expected
damages for breach (the product of a 20% probability of breach and
25% of $40), less $15, the cost of retaining the group). The expected
financial cost to Firm of firing the group is -$4 ($3, the expected
revenues from delivery of the update (30% of $10), less $7, the
expected damages from breach (70% of 25% of 40)). Thus, managers
expecting to pay ratable damages of 25% and obligated to maximize
the value of the sum of financial claims against the firm have an
incentive to fire the engineering group, which would reduce total
value. 4
7
2. Distorted Breach/Performance Decisions
As noted earlier, general principles of contract law require that
a party breaching a contract pay expectation damages that would
make the injured party as well off as it would have been had the
contract were performed. When the firm is solvent, the expectation
damages rule discourages breach of a value-creating contract by
making the breaching party bear the entire cost imposed on the other
party. Therefore, a solvent party will not have an incentive to breach
when its gain from breach (the loss it avoids by not performing) is less
than the cost imposed on the other party (the other party's forgone
gain from performance)-that is, when performance increases the size
46. Alternatively, one could imagine that there is a 75% probability that Firm will enter
bankruptcy, in which case the payout rate for unsecured claims will be 0%, and a 25%
probability that Firm will regain solvency and pay any damage claim in full.
47. Cf. Triantis, supra note 44, at 686 (observing that insolvent firms have an incentive to
engage in riskier methods of production than solvent firms). A number of contract scholars have
argued that expectation damages may induce overreliance by promisees who, knowing that they
will be compensated completely whether the promisor performs or breaches, have no incentive to
take into account in their reliance decisions the possibility of promisor breach. See, e.g., Steven
Shavell, supra note 35; Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of
Precaution, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1985); Aaron S. Edlin, Cadillac Contracts and Up-Front
Payments: Efficient Investment Under Expectation Damages, 12 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 98 (1996). To
the extent such overreliance occurs, managers might have an incentive to overinvest in the firm's
ability to perform its contracts. Id. at 689-90. As a result, there might be circumstances in which
managers of an insolvent firm reduce somewhat their level of investment in the firm's ability to
perform.
However, other contract scholars have argued that, as a practical matter, expectation
damages are applied in such a way that overreliance is very unlikely. See Eisenberg &
McDonnell, supra note 44. Even if such overreliance occurs, there are likely to be circumstances
in which the incentive for underinvestment will be much stronger than the incentive for
overinvestment. In those circumstances, the underinvestment problem will still arise.
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of the total pie shared by both parties. As previously recognized,
however, when firms are insolvent and therefore expect to pay only
ratable damages for breach, managers might have an incentive to
inefficiently breach contracts.
48
Returning to our example, suppose again that the net benefit to
Contract Partner of the software update is $40 ($50 benefit less the
$10 payment to Firm). But now suppose that the cost to Firm of
providing the software turns out to be $30 (for a net cost of $20 ($30
less the $10 payment from Contract Partner)). Unlike in the example
involving investment in ability to perform, where paying $15 to the
engineers merely increased the likelihood that Firm could perform the
contract from 30% to 80%, now suppose that the $30 cost is both
necessary and sufficient for Firm to produce the update. The cost of
$30 could represent the expenses Firm must incur to provide the
update. Alternatively, the $30 could represent the opportunity cost to
Firm of providing the update to Contract Partner rather than using
the same resources to create other products that Firm could sell for
$30. In either case, performance would be efficient because the net
benefit to Contract Partner ($40) exceeds the net cost to Firm ($20).
Begin by assuming that Firm is solvent. If Firm breaches by
refusing to update the software, Firm will neither incur any costs
(before paying damages) nor receive the $10 payment, and Contract
Partner will have an expectation damages claim for $40. Accordingly,
Firm would be forced to pay $40. If Firm performs, it will incur a net
cost of $20 ($30 cost of production less the $10 payment from Contract
Partner). When the firm is solvent, managers owing a duty to
maximize the financial value of the firm will not breach because the
cost of breach ($40) exceeds the net cost of performance ($20).49 This
result is efficient.
However, suppose that the likelihood of bankruptcy is 100%,
and that in bankruptcy, the payout rate for unsecured claims,
including Contract Partner's breach claim, is expected to be 25%. If
Firm's managers breach, Firm must pay just $10 on the $40 damages
claim. Because breach benefits Firm by saving it from incurring a net
expense of $20, breaching would provide a $10 ($20 less $10) net gain
to Firm. Thus, FVM will obligate managers to breach even when
48. See Fried, supra note 41, at 529-33; Triantis, supra note 44, at 692-94.
49. As in the example involving managers' investment decision, the alignment between
private and social optimality in the managers' breach decision when the firm can be made to pay
full damages is not an artifact of the particular values used. It would be easy to show that when
Firm can be made to pay full expectation damages for breach, managers required to maximize
the expected value of payments to creditors and shareholders will have an incentive to perform
the contract if, and only if, performance would create value.
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performance would increase value. As the expected payout rate
declines, the strength of the distortion increases.
The problem of inefficient breach under ratable damages is
identical to the problem that arises from the treatment of pre-
bankruptcy contracts in bankruptcy under § 365 of the Bankruptcy
Code. 50 Under § 365, the debtor may choose, subject to court approval
and various statutory restrictions, to "reject" (breach), perform, or
assign a contract. The consequences of rejection are the same as if the
firm had breached the contract prior to bankruptcy. That is, the firm
must pay ratable damages. Furthermore, the duty of the trustee is to
maximize the value available to pay those holding financial claims
against the estate. Thus, just as there is an incentive for inefficient
breach before bankruptcy under the FVM approach, there is an
incentive for inefficient rejection in bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy
Code.5 1
D. Potential Mechanisms for Reducing Distortions
As demonstrated in Section C, managers required to maximize
the value of financial claims against the firm might find themselves
obligated to underinvest in the firm's ability to perform its contracts
and to inefficiently breach contracts that the firm could perform. The
question remains whether parties to a contract can take steps to
ensure that these distortions-and the resulting losses-do not
actually arise. If these potential distortions can be eliminated at little
cost, then the FVM approach, while not conceptually correct, is almost
as good as the broader fiduciary duty that we propose.
This section considers two mechanisms that might reduce the
frequency and severity of these distortions: (1) the use of security
interests ex ante (at the time of contracting) to give contract partners'
breach claims priority in the event of either party's insolvency; and (2)
ex post renegotiation. As we explain below, these mechanisms might
mitigate the problems that we identify as arising from FVM but are
unlikely to substantially reduce them.
1. Security Interests
The distortions described in Section C can arise only to the
extent managers believe that, on an expected value basis, the firm will
not pay full damages for breach. However, the firm bears the costs
associated with these distortions ex ante. To the extent Contract Party
50. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2000).
51. See Fried, supra note 41, at 519-20.
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anticipates that Firm might become insolvent and underinvest in
contract performance or breach, Contract Party will insist on being
compensated in the contract ex ante by a more favorable contract
price. Thus, Firm has an incentive to structure the arrangement in a
way that eliminates these distortions.
Firm therefore might consider giving Contract Partner a
security interest in its assets to enable Contract Partner to enforce its
contractual rights (and perhaps vice versa). For example, Contract
Partner could take a security interest in some of Firm's assets. If Firm
fails to perform, Contract Partner could seize those assets, sell them,
and keep as much of the proceeds as is necessary to offset its damages.
If Firm's obligation could be secured completely-that is, if Firm could
offer Contract Partner collateral whose value equals or exceeds the
amount of any damages claim-Firm would be forced to pay full
damages for breach, even if Firm were insolvent. Accordingly, Firm
would be forced to internalize all of the cost that breach imposes on
Contract Partner.
For that reason, one might believe that if the problems of
underinvestment and inefficient breach arising during insolvency
were expected to be costly to the contracting parties, the parties
simply would take sufficient security interests in each other's assets to
eliminate these two problems. However, Firm and Contract Partner
are generally unlikely to issue each other adequate security interests
even if underinvestment and inefficient breach would impose a
significant cost upon the insolvency of one of the parties. First, neither
Firm nor Contract Partner is likely to have sufficient unencumbered
assets to fully collateralize the dozens (or more) of (non-loan) contracts
into which each may enter every year. 52 Second, even if there were
sufficient collateral at the time of contracting, the use of the security
interests would be costly:' the security interests would tie up the assets
serving as collateral, restricting the granting party's ability to
transfer, sell, or pledge the assets in order to enter into new projects
or pay for current expenses.5 3 And the costs associated with the use of
the security interests would be incurred whether or not either party
becomes insolvent. Thus, often it will not be worthwhile for the parties
52. In fact, the firm is unlikely to have enough collateral to secure all of its payment
creditors.
53. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured
Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 878 (1996); F.H. Buckley, The Bankruptcy Priority
Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REV. 1393, 1437-39 (1986); George G. Triantis, Secured Debt Under Conditions
of Imperfect Information, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 247-48 (1992). There would also be transaction
expenses associated with creating and maintaining a valid security interest. See Bebchuk &
Fried, supra, at 877-78.
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to fully or even partially secure each other's obligation even if
collateral is available. 54 The apparently infrequent use of security
interests to secure performance of non-loan contracts is therefore not
surprising. 55
2. Renegotiation
Even if contracting parties do not use security interests to
secure each other's future performance, they are free to renegotiate
the terms of their deal ex post. They will have an incentive to do so if
such renegotiation could, by avoiding the efficiency losses associated
with underinvestment and inefficient breach, make both parties better
off.
We begin by examining the likelihood that renegotiation will
solve the problem of inefficient breach and then turn to consider
renegotiation's ability to solve the problem of underinvestment. As we
explain, renegotiation might reduce somewhat the frequency of
inefficient breach but is unlikely to eliminate it, and it is likely to have
54. For example, suppose that the probability of one of the firms becoming insolvent during
the contract period is 5%. In that case, the parties will not find it worthwhile to use security
interests unless the cost to the two parties of using security interests is less than 5% of the cost
of the distortions that are expected to arise if one of the firms becomes insolvent. The expected
cost of the distortions would be 5% of D, where D is the expected cost of the distortion, given that
one of the firms has become insolvent. The parties would be willing to spend no more than 5% of
D to eliminate the distortion.
55. One might consider the possibility of statutorily providing prebankruptcy unsecured
breach claims higher priority in bankruptcy and under state debtor-creditor law. Cf. Triantis,
supra note 44, at 696-99 (suggesting that damage claims arising from rejection of contracts in
bankruptcy be given priority in order to avoid inefficient rejection in bankruptcy). For example,
unsecured breach claims arising before bankruptcy could be given priority in bankruptcy over
other unsecured claims. Certain unsecured claims-such as for unpaid wages to employees and
back taxes-are already given priority over other unsecured claims. See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (2000).
In principle, prebankruptcy breach claims could be added to the current list of priority unsecured
claims. To the extent that priority could be provided statutorily to contract breach claims-under
both bankruptcy and state insolvency law-it would have an effect equivalent to securing all of
the firm's contract claims with a security interest in the firm's assets, with potentially lower
transaction costs.
Even if such statutorily provided priority were desirable, however, it is unlikely to solve
completely the problems identified in this Article. Just as there is unlikely to be enough
collateral to secure all of a firm's performance obligations at the time it incurs those obligations,
there might well not be sufficient assets in bankruptcy or in a state insolvency proceeding to pay
all prebankruptcy breach damage claims in full. To the extent there are insufficient assets to pay
all of these claims in full, FVM would continue to give rise to distortions. Cf. Fried, supra note
41, at 546-47 (offering a similar criticism of Triantis's suggestion that damage claims arising
from rejection in bankruptcy be given priority). In any event, such statutory priority would
require significant revisions of the Bankruptcy Code and state insolvency laws. Thus, even if
statutory priority for prebankruptcy contract breach claims could completely solve the problems
we have identified, the distortions created by FVM would continue to arise until such priority
was created.
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even less of an effect on the problem of underinvestment in ability to
perform.
a. Renegotiation and Inefficient Breach
As is by now a familiar point in the contracts literature, both
parties to a value-creating contract that otherwise might be breached
inefficiently have an incentive to renegotiate and perform the contract
because the surplus created by performance can be shared in such a
way as to make both parties better off than under breach.56 However,
it is recognized that whether renegotiation occurs (and if it occurs,
whether it is successful) will depend in part on the transaction costs
associated with renegotiation, including those arising from the parties'
incentive to engage in strategic behavior.57 Renegotiation is not likely
to substantially mitigate the problems of inefficient breach and
insufficient investment in the firm's ability to perform.
Even under normal conditions-when both parties are
solvent-transaction costs and strategic behavior by the parties can
sometimes make successful renegotiation very difficult. 58 When one
party is insolvent, renegotiating is unlikely to become any easier.
Indeed, the failure of thousands of firms to negotiate workouts with
their creditors in order to avoid a costly bankruptcy proceeding
indicates that impediments to bargaining in the vicinity of insolvency
can be substantial. 59
One reason why insolvency might exacerbate the difficulty of
renegotiating with performance creditors is that the need to conserve
cash or stem losses might require insolvent firms to decide the
disposition of numerous contracts, many of them interconnected,
within a short period of time. Time constraints might make it
impossible for an insolvent firm to renegotiate successfully with
multiple, interdependent contract partners.
For example, suppose that the software sold by Firm to
Contract Partner in our earlier examples is instead sold to ten
licensees, each of which is contractually entitled to the update. Under
56. Craswell, supra note 34, at 638-40.
57. Id. at 638-39; Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Towards a
General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 982-83 (1983).
58. Goetz & Scott, supra note 57, at 982-83.
59. If an insolvent firm could easily renegotiate with its creditors, the problem of excessive
risk taking would not arise under the SVM approach because shareholders and creditors with
financial claims against the firm would renegotiate the terms of their arrangements so that all of
the parties could be made better off by a higher-value, lower-risk project. Thus, if renegotiation
were a panacea, there would be no efficiency rationale for courts shifting managers' fiduciary
duty to include any creditors-payment or performance-when the firm becomes insolvent.
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the terms of the licenses, each licensee must pay $10 for the update.
The benefit to each licensee of the update is $50, so the net benefit to
each licensee of getting the update is $40 (for a total of $400). Suppose
it will cost the Firm $300 to produce the update, for which it will
receive $10 from each of the ten licensees (for a total of $100).
Suppose again that if Firm breaches, it will be required to pay
damages at 25% of their face amount for a total of $100. Firm might
consider asking each licensee for an additional payment of $25 each,
bringing the total each pays to $35, in exchange for the update. Such
an arrangement would make everyone better off than if Firm
breaches: instead of paying $100 in damages (25% of $400), Firm
would make a $50 profit. (It would invest $300 in producing the
update and receive payments totaling $350 from the licensees.)
Instead of recovering $100 in damages, the licensees collectively would
pay $350 for software worth $500 to them, and thus collectively enjoy
a (net) benefit of $150.
However, bargaining with ten licensees to get them each to pay
$25 extra would take time-more time than if Firm were just
negotiating with (a single) Contract Partner. In insolvency, Firm
would face greater time pressures because of the need to conserve cash
and reduce costs, which would greatly reduce the likelihood of such
negotiations ever taking place.
Even if negotiations begin with each of the licensees, there is
an obvious holdout problem. Once the update is created, the marginal
cost of supplying a copy to another licensee would be zero, and Firm
would agree to sell such a copy to a licensee for the original contract
price of $10. Each licensee therefore has an incentive to refuse to pay
an extra $25 for the update while hoping that a sufficient number of
the remaining nine licensees agree to pay an extra $25 each so that it
becomes worthwhile for Firm to produce the update. The situation
would be even worse if-as is often the case-the licensees operate in
different geographical regions, making face-to-face meetings between
Firm and the licensees and coordination among the licensees more
difficult. In short, even if renegotiation can prevent inefficient breach
in some cases, in other situations it is likely to be ineffective.
b. Renegotiation and Underinvestment
Even if renegotiation could substantially reduce the incidence
of inefficient breach, it is likely to have a much smaller impact on the
problem of underinvestment. The reason is that it will be more
difficult for the insolvent party to convince the other party to accept
worse terms in exchange for the promise of optimal investment than to
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accept worse terms in exchange for performance. We briefly expand on
this claim using our example of insolvent Firm and Contract Partner.
Start with the scenario in which insolvent Firm and Contract
Partner bargain over performance of the contract rather than over
Firm's investment in its ability to perform the contract. A necessary
condition for successful renegotiation is that Firm must convince
Contract Partner that the latter is better off agreeing to terms more
favorable to Firm than insisting on the original provisions of the
contract. Thus, Firm must convince Contract Partner that if the terms
are not adjusted, (1) Firm will breach and (2) as a result, Contract
Partner will receive less than the net benefit it would enjoy from
performance under the renegotiated terms.60 Of course, this is easier
said than done. And meeting this condition will not be sufficient for
the renegotiation to be successful: the parties still might haggle over
the terms, in the hope of extracting a larger portion of the surplus.
However, unless Firm can convince Contract Partner that (1) and (2)
are true, the renegotiation surely will fail.
Now consider renegotiation over Firm's investment in its
ability to perform. Here, Firm must convince Contract Partner that (1)
if the terms are adjusted, Firm will invest optimally in its ability to
perform the contract; (2) if the terms are not adjusted, Firm will not
invest optimally; and (3) if Firm does not invest optimally, Contract
Partner will be worse off, on an expected value basis, than if the terms
were adjusted and Firm invested optimally.
It is easy to see that, however difficult it may be to renegotiate
over performance, it would be much more difficult to convince
Contract Partner to adjust the terms of the contract in favor of Firm in
exchange for Firm's promising to invest optimally in its ability to
perform the contract. To begin with, Firm must convince Contract
Partner that if the latter agrees to worse terms, Firm will optimally
invest in its ability to perform the contract. However, depending on
the parameters, Firm might have an incentive to continue to
underinvest even after extracting a concession from Contract Partner.
The level of investment cannot readily be observed and verified by
Contract Partner or a third party. Furthermore, even if the level of
investment could readily be observed and verified, Firm's commitment
to make certain investments could not easily be enforced because Firm
is insolvent. There is no similar requirement in bargaining over
performance.
60. Firm does not need to convince Contract Partner that, if the latter accepts the terms,
Firm will perform the contract, unless acceptance of the new terms reduces the size of Contract
Partner's damage claim in the event of Firm's breach.
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In both types of renegotiation, Firnm must convince Contract
Party that it will take a certain step-breach or fail to invest
optimally-if the terms are not readjusted. Firm can convince
Contract Partner that it will breach the contract if the terms are not
readjusted, simply by announcing its intention to do so. The
announcement of breach is credible because it gives Contract Partner
the right to sue for breach and/or terminate the contract, and thus
imposes a potentially high cost on Firm. Convincing Contract Partner
that Firm will not invest optimally is much more difficult; such a
statement is not credible because it does not impose any cost on Firm.
Because it imposes no cost on Firm, Firm's managers have an
incentive to make the threat to underinvest whether or not they plan
to follow through on it in order to try to extract better terms from
Contract Party. For these reasons, we believe that the obstacles to
renegotiation over investment are likely to be even greater than the
stumbling blocks to renegotiation over performance, and thus that
renegotiation is unlikely to eliminate the investment distortion that
arises under the FVM approach.
IV. THE DESIRABLE APPROACH: MAXIMIZING THE TOTAL VALUE OF ALL
CLAIMS AGAINST THE FIRM
In Part III, we saw that the FVM approach favored by
commentators is not the conceptually correct approach to the fiduciary
duty of an insolvent firm's managers because it might cause those
managers to make contract investment and performance decisions
that are not efficient. The purpose of this part is to put forward and
describe the conceptually correct approach to managers' fiduciary duty
when the firm is insolvent: to require managers to maximize the value
of the sum of all claims-both performance and financial-against the
firm. Section A sets out this approach and shows that such an
approach would (in principle) eliminate the identified distortions.
Section B then explains how such a duty could make shareholders
better off ex ante.
A. Description of the Approach
In Part III we showed that when the firm is insolvent,
managers seeking to maximize the financial value of the firm might
underinvest in the firm's ability to perform its contractual obligations
and to breach inefficiently contracts the firm can perform. The
problem is that by obligating managers to maximize the value of the
sum of financial claims against the firm without regard to the effect of
18412002]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
their decision on the value of performance claims against the firm,
FVM encourages managers to inefficiently transfer value from
performance creditors to those holding financial claims against the
firm.
Our analysis indicates that the correct approach from an
efficiency perspective is to have managers maximize the sum of the
values of all claims, both financial and performance, against the firm.
Equivalently, managers should maximize the sum of the financial and
performance values of the firm.
We illustrate the difference between our proposed approach
and FVM using a simple example: Suppose that the only decision an
insolvent firm's managers must make is whether to breach or perform
a contract that would provide performance value to the firm's contract
partner. Consider first the case in which performance would increase
the financial value of the firm. In such a case, under both the FVM
approach and our proposed approach, the firm's managers should
perform the contract. Next, consider the situation in which
performance would reduce the financial value of the firm by more than
the value it would provide the firm's contract partner. Again, the FVM
approach and our proposed approach would yield the same result:
managers should not perform the contract, even though breach would
hurt the performance creditor (which does not receive full
compensation). Finally, consider the case in which performance would
reduce the financial value of the firm but provide a greater amount of
performance value to the other party. In that case, the prescriptions of
the FVM approach and our approach would diverge. Under FVM,
managers would be obligated to breach the contract. Under our
approach, managers would be obligated to perform the contract, even
though performance would reduce the financial value of the firm. Put
differently, when the firm is insolvent, managers' fiduciary duty would
require them to perform the contract unless breach would be efficient.
It is important to emphasize that the approach we advocate
would apply after fiduciary duties have shifted to include the firm's
creditors, but before the firm has entered bankruptcy. Once the firm
enters bankruptcy, the managers' decisions-including their decisions
to perform, reject, or assign prebankruptcy contracts-are governed by
the Bankruptcy Code, which supersedes corporate law whenever the
two are inconsistent.6 1
61. For a description of the treatment of prebankruptcy contracts in bankruptcy, see supra
note 55.
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B. The Effect on Shareholders
Requiring managers of an insolvent firm to consider the effect
of their decisions on the firm's performance creditors would tend to
make shareholders of these firms worse off ex post than they would be
under the FVM approach. Shareholders would be worse off because
their fiduciary protection is further "diluted": managers would be
obligated to treat as on par with shareholders not only the firm's
payment creditors but also the firm's performance creditors.
Under our proposed approach, managers would be prohibited
from taking steps that transfer value to shareholders (and payment
creditors) from a firm's contract partner unless the benefit to the firm
exceeds the loss to the contract partner. In addition, managers might
be required to take steps that transfer value from shareholders (and
payment creditors) to the firm's performance creditors whenever the
gain to performance creditors exceeds the loss to shareholders and
payment creditors.
One therefore might object to extending fiduciary protection to
the contract partners of an insolvent firm on the ground that such a
step is inconsistent with the notion of shareholder primacy. However,
it is already well established that managers owe, and should owe, a
fiduciary duty to payment creditors when the firm is insolvent.
Extending this duty to include performance creditors is no more
inconsistent with the notion of shareholder primacy than is the duty
already extended to payment creditors.
In addition, and more importantly, if managers were to take
performance creditors into account should the firm become insolvent,
shareholders would benefit ex ante. To be sure, managers would be
prohibited from inefficiently transferring value from performance
creditors to shareholders and payment creditors ex post.62 But to the
extent eliminating this distortion increases the profits (or reduces the
losses) of performance creditors, performance creditors would provide
the firm with more favorable terms when entering into contracts with
the firm. The more favorable terms would, in turn, benefit the firm's
residual claimants, the shareholders. And the benefit from improved
terms that the shareholders capture ex ante should exceed (on an
expectation basis) the amount captured by shareholders of the
insolvent firms ex post under FVM.
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that firms are more
likely to enter into contracts with a firm that later becomes insolvent
62. Cf. Lin, supra note 6, at 1498 (making the analogous point about the ex ante benefits to
shareholders of extending managers' fiduciary duty to creditors holding financial claims).
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than they are likely to become insolvent themselves. As a result,
shareholders of any given firm are more likely to gain ex post under
our approach (relative to FVM) than they are likely to lose.
V. CONCLUSION
There is an emerging consensus among corporate law scholars
that, from an efficiency perspective, an insolvent firm's managers
should be required not to maximize shareholder value but rather the
value of the sum of the values of all financial claims against the firm-
both those held by shareholders and those held by creditors. This
Article has pointed out an unrecognized flaw with this financial value
maximization approach that may cause managers to act inefficiently.
The Article has shown that the FVM approach fails to
recognize that a firm is likely to have two types of creditors: (1)
"payment creditors"-parties owed cash by the firm, which have a
financial claim against the firm; and (2) "performance creditors"-
parties owed contractual performance, which have claims for
performance against the firm. The FVM approach requires managers
to take into account the effect of their actions on one type of creditor-
payment creditors-but to ignore the effect of their actions on the
other-performance creditors. This in turn might cause managers to
take steps that hurt performance creditors more than they benefit
those holding financial claims against the firm-payment creditors
and equityholders.
We have proposed, as an alternative to FVM, that managers of
an insolvent firm have a fiduciary duty to maximize the sum of the
values of claims-both financial and performance-against the firm.
Finally, we have explained how such a duty would actually benefit
shareholders in the long run by reducing the cost to firms of entering
into contracts. We hope that this Article will contribute to a better
understanding of the proper scope of managers' fiduciary duty upon a
firm's insolvency.
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